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Abstract 
When people are faced with a choice between a sure option (e.g., 200 people will be 
saved) and a risky option (e.g., 1/3 probability that 600 people will be saved and 2/3 probability 
that none will be saved), they tend to choose the sure option in the gain frame (e.g., the verb 
“save” is used) and the risky option in the loss frame (e.g., the verb “die” is used). This 
difference is the standard risky-choice framing effect (Tversky & Kahneman, 1981). However, 
very few studies of this effect have used “somewhat risky” (SR) options in which the outcomes 
are not all-or-none. Additionally, different theories (e.g., Prospect Theory, Fuzzy-Trace Theory, 
Explicated Valence Account, Sentiment Analysis) make different predictions for framing effects 
in some choices involving SR options. In our study, the option pool included 4 SR options, a sure 
option, and an all-or-none risky option. The SR options differed in whether there was a zero 
outcome (e.g., none saved) in one frame and whether the probabilities matched those in the risky 
option. 15 option pairs and 2 frames yielded 30 cells (between-subjects), each with 4 domains 
(e.g., disease, investment; within-subjects). We obtained participants through OSU’s Research 
Experience Program (REP) (N =887) and MTurk (N=946). For our analysis, we used mixed-
effects logistic regression and fit separate models for individual theories. We found that 
Sentiment Analysis (a text-based account) fit best for the REP sample, whereas Prospect Theory 
(a mathematical model that involves weighting one’s utilities for the possible outcomes) fit best 
for the MTurk sample. However, none of the theories predicted framing effects very accurately 
in our expanded choice set. There was almost always a significant residual framing effect and 
substantial unexplained variation in choice proportions. These results suggest that people might 
not apply a consistent set of principles across all choice pairs, but instead apply different 
decision-making strategies in different situations. 
Keywords: framing effects, prospect theory, somewhat risky options 
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Introduction 
Several times people have to make decisions for choices that involve risk, e.g., choosing 
an insurance plan or buying stocks. There is always some uncertainty involved in the stock 
market. How do people decide which stocks to buy or sell? Or they might have to choose 
between two treatments for diabetic foot: dressing and amputation. Dressing the foot does not 
guarantee that it will be healed. If the wound festers, amputation is required for a bigger area. So, 
some people choose to undergo amputation directly. Hence, risk can also be involved while 
choosing a medical procedure. It is interesting to understand how people perceive the risk of the 
alternatives and respond while making these choices. These types of questions are typically 
studied by presenting participants with gambles and asking them to make choices. Multiple 
theories have been developed to explain the observations in risky-choice decision making. One 
effect which is observed in the studies involving risk is the framing effect. The evidence for 
framing effects was first collected when Prospect Theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Tversky 
& Kahneman, 1981) was introduced as an improvement to the widely accepted Expected Utility 
Theory (Savage, 1954; von Neumann & Morgenstern, 1944). 
Consider the traditional Asian Disease Problem (Tversky & Kahneman, 1981) in the 
original wording where the participants had to choose between the two alternatives of whichever 
of the two problems was presented to them: 
Imagine that the U.S. is preparing for the outbreak of an unusual Asian  disease, which is 
expected to kill 600 people. Two alternative programs to combat the disease have been 
proposed. Assume that the exact scientific estimates of the consequences of the program 
are as follows: 
Problem 1: 
If Program A is adopted, 200 people will be saved. 
If Program B is adopted, there is a 1/3 probability that 600 people will be saved, and 2/3 
probability that no people will be saved. 
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Which of the two programs would you favor? 
Problem 2: 
If Program C is adopted, 400 people will die. 
If Program D is adopted, there is a 1/3 probability that nobody will die, and 2/3 
probability that 600 people will die. 
Which of the two programs would you favor? 
Alternatives A and C are characterized as the “sure” options because there is a 100% 
probability of the event occurring. Since B and D have probabilities which are not 1, there is risk 
involved and so they are called the “risky” options. 
Most people chose Program A in problem 1, whereas most people chose Program D in 
problem 2. If we look closely, we observe that A and C are equivalent, as are B and D. The 
difference between the problems is that “save” is used in problem 1 and “die” is used in problem 
2. This different preference for the options based on the framing is the risky-choice framing 
effect. 
Expected Utility Theory states that each person has a utility function for the total quantity 
of a thing (e.g., wealth). For most people, this function is concave with diminishing marginal 
utility. An increase or decrease in the quantity of interest (e.g., dollars)  causes the value to move 
up or down along the same function. As the two framings of the problem are effectively 
equivalent, people should not change their preference of the options based on the framing. 
However, contrary to the prediction by the Expected Utility Theory, a reversal is observed.  
Prospect theory accommodates for these observations by differentiating between the Gain 
frame and the Loss frame. It also proposes that an implicit reference point is created in the mind 
depending on which frame is used. Problem 1 falls under the Gain frame because it contains the 
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word “save”, which results in the implicit reference point becoming “none are saved”. Problem 2 
is in the Loss frame since it contains “die” which makes “none die” the reference point. 
Figure 1 shows the hypothetical value function (with an exaggerated shape) as put forth 
by the Prospect Theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Tversky & Kahneman, 1981). The theory 
states that most people are risk-averse in the Gain frame, shown by the concave shape. Also, 
people tend to be risk-seeking in Loss frame (convex shape). A value function for a person who 
has no risk-aversion or risk-seeking would be a straight line with a positive slope. Risk-aversion 
implies a greater preference for the sure option (A in the gain frame) and risk-seeking means a 
greater preference for the risky option (D in the loss frame). Hence, Prospect Theory explains the 
standard framing effect.   
  
                                       Figure 1 
Gains Losses 
Value 
Concave => Risk-averse 
Convex => Risk-seeking 
Steeper in Losses => Loss-aversion 
Reference point 
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Prospect Theory also has the components of loss aversion and non-linear probability 
weighting. Loss aversion refers to a steeper slope of the value function in the loss frame than in 
the gain frame. It means that people dislike a loss more than they like a gain of the same 
quantity. In addition, the theory states that low probabilities are overweighted and moderate and 
higher probabilities are underweighted. The framing effect problem was not created to test these 
parts of the theory. 
The above example only contains sure and risky options. However, it is possible to create 
somewhat-risky options and check whether this effect is observed with the new cases. This 
expanded option pool can also be used to test the generalizability of Prospect Theory and other 
competing theories. 
 
Somewhat risky options 
Observe that in a standard risky option in the gain frame ”1/3 probability that 600 people 
will be saved” is the outcome with the highest extreme value (since the total number of people in 
the story is 600). Whereas “2/3 probability that no people will be saved” outcome contains the 
lowest extreme value i.e., zero (no people). There are many ways to construct an option where 
either one or both of the outcome endpoints are pulled in towards the midpoint. E.g., “1/3 
probability that 450 people will be saved and 2/3 probability that 75 people will be saved” 
(Miller & Fagley, 1991). Here the endpoints are not present anymore, the probabilities match 
those in the standard risky option, and the expected value is the same as the standard sure and 
risky options. This is an example of a Somewhat-risky option (specifically Somewhat-Risky 
Matched, as we will define later). The details of all the option types we used are included in the 
Methods Stimuli section.  
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Significance of this study 
 There has been limited research on framing effects with somewhat risky options (e.g., 
Schneider, 1992; Tombu & Mandel, 2015). Also, multiple theories have been proposed over the 
years for explaining framing effects (e.g., Fuzzy-Trace Theory, Explicated Valence Account). 
Although all these theories correctly predict the standard framing effect, their predictions differ 
for some comparisons when somewhat-risky options come into the picture. This study aims to 
bridge the gap in the literature by (a) inspecting framing effects with some unexplored 
somewhat-risky options, and (b) testing and finding how well the theories of risky choice 
generalize for framing effects across the expanded choice set. 
 
Theories and Accounts 
In this section, we will review all the theories and accounts we compared in our study. 
Prospect Theory 
We used four versions of Prospect Theory for our comparisons: 
1. Full Prospect Theory. The parameter values for this version were taken from Tversky 
and Kahneman (1992). The power in the value function for gains (α) and for losses (β) 
are both 0.88.  Loss aversion parameter (λ) is 2.25, implying steeper slope in losses than 
gains. Probability weighting in gains (γ) is 0.61 and in losses (δ) is 0.69, implying the 
usual non-linear probability weighting pattern. 
      Since loss aversion and non-linear probability weighting do not typically play a role in 
the explanations of framing effects, we decided to test simpler versions of the theory by 
removing these parameters. 
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2. Prospect Theory without loss aversion. We fixed λ to 1 to eliminate loss aversion. This 
implies that the slope in losses is no longer steeper than in gains. Other parameters were 
the same the full Prospect Theory. 
3. Prospect Theory without weighting parameters. Next, we removed the weighting of 
the probabilities by setting γ = δ = 1. This made the probability weighting function linear. 
Other parameters were the same as the full Prospect Theory. 
4. Prospect Theory without loss aversion or weighting parameters. In this plain version 
of Prospect theory, we removed both loss aversion and probability weighting (λ = 1, γ = 
1, δ = 1) from the full version. The only feature of Prospect Theory remaining here is the 
risk-aversion (concave value) in gains and risk-seeking (convex value) in losses relative 
to reference points. 
To obtain standardized predictions from each version of this theory, we input the above 
parameter values in the Cumulative Prospect Theory score calculator for each option 
(Köbberling, 2002). Since all our options have at most 2 outcomes, Cumulative Prospect Theory 
and Prospect Theory yield the same prospect score. Then we coded each option pair as the 
difference between the less risky option and the more risky option (PT[less risky]-PT[more 
risky]) and standardized option pairs across domains by dividing the difference by the magnitude 
of the domain (e.g., the number of lives at stake) raised to the 0.88 power. 
Fuzzy-Trace Theory 
 Fuzzy-Trace Theory (Reyna & Brainerd, 1991, 1995) states that people look at the gist 
and verbatim of the options separately while making a choice. Gist is the essence or 
understanding of the meaning whereas verbatim is the exact numerical (mathematical) 
representation of the option. People rely on the simplest gist representation which helps them 
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distinguish between options. There are three types of comparisons under Fuzzy-Trace Theory 
(Broniatowski & Reyna, 2018)- 
1. Categorical: In this case, the choices are classified into categories (e.g., “some saved” vs. 
“none saved”) and the categories are compared. These are the categorical translations of 
the options in our example: 
a. Sure option: “200 people will be saved” becomes “Some are saved”. 
b. Risky option: “1/3 probability that 600 people will be saved and 2/3 probability 
that no people will be saved” becomes “Some are saved or none are saved”. 
c. Somewhat-Risky Matched option: “1/3 probability that 450 people will be saved 
and 2/3 probability that 75 people will be saved” becomes “Some are saved or 
some are saved”. 
According to the categorical representation (Reyna, 2012), in the gain frame the Sure option 
will be preferred over the Risky option, as the Risky option contains the “none are saved” part. 
In the Somewhat-Risky Matched vs. Risky comparison, the Somewhat-Risky Matched option 
will be preferred as it contains “some are saved” in the second outcome against the “none are 
saved” in the Risky option. However, for the Sure vs. Somewhat-Risky Matched pair, there will 
be no preference because neither of the two options contains “none are saved” to make it worse 
than the other. Hence, for Sure vs Somewhat-Risky Matched, the categorical comparison from 
Fuzzy-Trace Theory predicts no preference. 
2. Ordinal: In this comparison, words like ‘fewer’ and ‘more’ are used within the same 
category (i.e., compare ‘some’ parts from one option to ‘some’ or ‘none’ parts from the 
other option).  
a. Risky option: “1/3 probability that 600 people will be saved and 2/3 probability 
that no people will be saved”- 
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i. “Less chance that more are saved and more chance that none are saved”. 
b. Somewhat-Risky Matched option: “1/3 probability that 450 people will be saved 
and 2/3 probability that 75 people will be saved”- 
i. “Less chance that some are saved and more chance that fewer are saved”. 
In the choices we will consider, the ordinal comparison will never matter. Also since the 
expected values of all our options are the same, a better outcome on the higher end is offset 
with a worse outcome on the lower end for each of the options. Hence, it is not possible to 
distinguish between the options in our choice pool using this comparison. Subsequently, we 
do not use ordinal representation while coding our options.  
3. Interval (verbatim): If the previous two comparisons do not yield a clear decision, the 
expected values of the options help in making the decision. However, we do not use 
interval representation while coding our options since all our options have the same 
expected value. 
Unlike Prospect Theory where the coding of the pairs has continuous values obtained 
from a function of the difference between the less risky option and the more risky option, the 
Fuzzy-Trace Theory has discrete values. The pairs are coded “1” in the less risky option is 
preferred according to the theory, “0” when there should not be a preference, and “-1” in the 
more risky option would be preferred by the participant. Since Fuzzy-Trace Theory doesn’t say 
anything about the magnitude of the categorical difference, we use unit differences for the codes. 
Explicated Valence Account 
 According to the Explicated Valence Account, people pay attention to the explicated 
outcome valence (the goodness or badness) of the options while making decisions (Tombu & 
Mandel, 2015). For the traditional sure option in the gain frame, people being saved is a good 
thing, so the sure option has a positive valence. On the other hand, the risky option as a positive 
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part (“600 will be saved”) and a negative part (“none will be saved”). Hence, the valence of the 
risky option is mixed. Therefore, the sure option is preferred over the risky option in the gain 
frame, as positive is better than mixed. In the loss frame, the sure option has negative valence 
(“400 people will die”), but the risky option has mixed valence (positive for “none will die” and 
negative for “600 will die”). Hence, the risky option is preferred in the loss frame as mixed 
valence is more desirable than negative valence. 
 When we consider the somewhat-risky matched choice, the “450 will be saved” part has 
positive valence and the “75 people will be saved” part also has positive valence. Hence, people 
would have no preference between the sure and somewhat-risky matched options in the gain 
frame because both options have the same valence. Furthermore, they would choose both of 
these options over the risky option. Similarly, the sure and somewhat-risky matched options will 
both have a negative valence in the loss frame and will be less preferred as compared to the risky 
option which will have a mixed valence (Tombu & Mandel, 2015). This absence of preference 
between the sure and somewhat-risky matched options is contrary to what Prospect Theory 
predicts for comparisons involving somewhat-risky matched options. 
 We coded the option pairs as “1” if the less risky option would be preferred, “0” for no 
preference, and “-1” if the more risky option would be preferred. Incidentally, the option pair 
coding from Explicated Valence Account turns out to be the same as Fuzzy-Trace Theory for the 
stimuli in our study (though this is not always the case for other types of option pairs). 
Sentiment Analysis 
Sentiment Analysis is a natural language processing technique which assigns a positive, 
negative, or neutral value to some text by processing it for negators, intensifiers, de-amplifiers, 
etc. Exactly which aspects of the text are processed, and which coding scheme is used depends 
on the specific sentiment analysis tool. We can say that this technique focuses on the “gist” of 
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the sentence as it only analyses the text and does not take numbers into consideration (Wall, 
Crookes, Johnson, & Weber, 2020). For predictions from Sentiment analysis, we obtained the 
sentiment value for each option using the sentiment() function from the sentimentr package in R 
(Rinker, 2019) and assigned the difference between the less risky option and more risky option to 
each option pair. If we obtain the sentiment of the three options in the gain frame of our example, 
the sure option has a score of 0.4, the risky one has 0, and the somewhat-risky matched option 
scores 0.44. Hence, this account predicts that the somewhat-risky matched option is preferred 
over the risky option and slightly preferred over the sure option in the gain frame. It also says 
that the sure option is preferred over the risky one, as in the standard framing effect. In the loss 
frame for this example, the risky option is preferred over the other two options, and the sure 
option is preferred over the somewhat-risky matched option.  
More accounts 
In a previous meta-study in the DeKay lab (DeKay, Rubinchik, & De Boeck, 2019; 
Rubinchik, 2019), the researchers found that there was an enhanced framing effect in the 
Somewhat-Risky Matched vs. Risky comparison than in the traditional Sure vs. Risky 
comparison. This result was not exactly predicted by any of the theories mentioned above, 
though Sentiment Analysis would predict a small increase in the effect size. Hence, we defined a 
couple additional accounts to possibly explain these results. 
1. Fuzzy-Trace Theory +. This modified version of Fuzzy-Trace Theory predicts a higher 
framing effect in comparisons with matching outcome probabilities, as it suggests that the 
matched probabilities will make the options more “alignable” and draw more attention to the 
categorical comparison between the zero and non-zero outcomes. Consider the somewhat-risky 
matched vs. risky option from our example. The first parts “1/3 probability that 450 people will 
be saved”(Somewhat-risky matched) and “1/3 probability that 600 people will be saved” (Risky)  
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have matching probabilities and both translate to “some are saved”. The second parts of the 
options “2/3 probability that 75 people will be saved” (Somewhat-risky matched) and “2/3 
probability that no people will be saved” (Risky) have matching probabilities (e.g., 2/3). The 
matching probabilities might draw attention to this “some” vs. “none” comparison, resulting in 
an enhanced framing effect when compared to the standard effect in sure vs. risky. Several 
articles (e.g., Reyna, 2012; Reyna & Brainerd, 1995) have made similar arguments for other 
types of framing questions. Hence, Fuzzy Trace Theory + also includes the coed -2 and +2 for 
the predictions. 
2. Good/Bad Count. This is a modified version of Explicated Valence Account which 
states that an option with two positive outcomes will appear better than an option with one 
positive outcome. And two negative outcomes will appear worse than a single negative outcome 
(in loss frame). So, the difference between somewhat-risky matched vs. risky will seem larger 
than between sure vs. risky. Hence, the framing effect size will be bigger for these comparisons. 




Participants. We used Qualtrics to collect responses for the study. 1138 undergraduate 
introductory psychology students (Mage = 19 years, 62% females) were recruited through the 
OSU REP system. To validate our findings, we replicated the study using a non-student sample 
from MTurk with 1024 participants (Mage = 40 years, 51% females). This sample size was 
determined by considering about 30 participants for each of the 30 cells (details in the Stimuli 
section). 
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Stimuli. There were 30 cells in the study. A pool of 6 types of options with varying degrees of 
riskiness was used to construct the cells. The options below are ordered in an increasing order of 
riskiness based on the utility function U(x) = xα for any α between 0 and 1 in the gain frame 
(Schneider, 1992). To illustrate the 6 options, we will use the cancer domain. 
Scenario: The National Cancer Institute has two possible treatment programs for a rare form 
of skin cancer that has affected 9,000 people in the country. There are adequate resources to 
implement only one of the two treatment programs. 
[Option Pool for Gain frame in Cancer Domain] 
1. Sure option: 3,600 patients will be saved. 
• Traditional sure option (Tversky & Kahneman, 1981) 
2. Somewhat-risky mismatched option: There is a 1/4 probability that 7,500 patients will be 
saved and a 3/4 probability that 2,300 patients will be saved. 
• The term ‘Mismatched’ means that the probabilities do not match those in the 
Risky option, number 6. 
3. Somewhat-risky matched option: There is a 2/5 probability that 6,300 patients will be 
saved and a 3/5 probability that 1,800 patients will be saved. 
• The term ‘Matched’ means that the probabilities match those in the Risky option, 
number 6. 
4. Somewhat-risky zero-in-loss option: There is a 1/4 probability that 9,000 patients will be 
saved and a 3/4 probability that 1,800 patients will be saved. 
• This option contains the larger endpoint outcome (i.e., 9000) but not the smaller 
endpoint (i.e., 0) in the Gain frame. In the Loss frame, there is a 1/4 probability 
that no patients will die. It is analogous to the Schneider’s (1992) 25/75 option.  
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5. Somewhat-risky zero-in-gain option: There is a 3/5 probability that 6,000 patients will 
be saved and a 2/5 probability that no patients will be saved. 
• This option contains the smaller endpoint outcome (i.e., 0) but not the larger 
endpoint (i.e., 9000) in the Gain frame. In the Loss frame, the larger endpoint 
(i.e., 9000) is present. It is analogous to the Schneider’s (1992) 75/25 option. 
6. Risky option: There is a 2/5 probability that 9,000 patients will be saved and a 3/5 
probability that no patients will be saved. 
• The traditional all-or-none risky option (Tversky & Kahneman, 1981). It is also 
analogous to the Schneider’s (1992) 50/50 option. 
The options had the same expected value but differed in the probabilities and outcomes. 
Each condition included one pair of these options. There were 6 x 5 / 2 = 15 pairs in the gain 
frame and 15 corresponding pairs in the loss frame, for a total of 30 pairs (cells). Further 
information on the construction of options is given in the Appendix. 
Procedure. Each participant was assigned to one of the 30 cells. Regardless of condition, each 
participant was asked to make four choices, one in each of four domains (wildfire, drought, 
investment, and cancer), in random order. For each choice, the participants also had to indicate 
their preference on a 7-point scale with endpoints labeled ‘Strong Preference for A [or B]’ and 
the midpoint labeled ‘No Preference at All’. Figure 2 is an example from the Wildfire domain 
(based on Peters & Levin, 2008). 
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Table 1 
Stimuli values for the Gain frame 













Sure 3600 1 0 0 
Somewhat-Risky Mismatched 5400 2/5 2400 3/5 
Somewhat-Risky Matched 4800 3/5 1800 2/5 
Somewhat-Risky Zero-in-Loss 6000 2/5 2000 3/5 
Somewhat-Risky Zero-in-Gain 4800 3/4 0 1/4 





Sure 24000 1 0 0 
Somewhat-Risky Mismatched 42000 1/3 15000 2/3 
Somewhat-Risky Matched 36000 1/2 12000 1/2 
Somewhat-Risky Zero-in-Loss 48000 1/3 12000 2/3 
Somewhat-Risky Zero-in-Gain 36000 2/3 0 1/3 





Sure 24000 1 0 0 
Somewhat-Risky Mismatched 60000 1/5 15000 4/5 
Somewhat-Risky Matched 48000 1/3 12000 2/3 
Somewhat-Risky Zero-in-Loss 72000 1/5 12000 4/5 
Somewhat-Risky Zero-in-Gain 48000 1/2 0 1/2 
Risky 72000 1/3 0 2/3 
 
Exclusion criteria. We excluded participants who finished the task too quickly or too slowly: 
completion time less than 60 seconds or more than 2.5 SDs above or below the mean completion 
time after transforming the timings with a Box-Cox transformation, for answering any pair of 
binary-choice and continuous-preference questions inconsistently (e.g., choosing A but rating B 
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as more preferred) or not answering two or more of the eight choice and preference questions. 
The final sample size used for analysis was 887 from REP and 946 from MTurk. 
 
Results and Discussion 
In the REP sample (Figure 3), the less risky option is chosen 87% of the time in the gain 
frame and 53% of the time in the loss frame. In the MTurk sample (Figure 4), the less risky 
option is chosen 93% of the time in the gain frame and 47% of the time in the loss frame. Hence, 
overall there is a sizeable framing effect in both samples. There is also a slight preference for the 
less risky option.  
Framing effects across conditions 
For each of 15 conditions in gain and loss frames, we computed the proportion of choices 
in which the less risky option was chosen (Figure 3, Figure 4). A framing effect is observed 
where the gain point (salmon color) is above the loss point (cyan color), which is apparent for 
most points in the figures. 
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Figure 3. Proportion of choices where the less risky option was chosen in the REP sample is 
plotted for each of the 15 conditions for gain (salmon) and loss (cyan) frame. Conditions 1v4, 
2v3, and 3v4 do not have a significant framing effect. 
 
Figure 4. Proportion of choices where the less risky option was chosen in the MTurk sample is 
plotted for each of the 15 conditions for gain (salmon) and loss (cyan) frame. Conditions 2v3, 
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 Eight of these conditions have been studied previously and 7 are novel conditions. 
Although it is a laborious process, looking at the conditions separately will enable us to detect 
any patterns based on theories and connect the results to the previous literature. Regression 
models considering all the conditions together are presented later. For Prospect Theory and 
Sentiment Analysis (both of which have continuous predictions), we considered all predictions 
with the gain and loss coding differences (not to be confused with p-value) less than or equal 
to .05 as near-zero effects.  
I) Previously studied conditions 
First, consider the traditional sure vs. risky comparison: 
Condition 1v6: Sure vs. Risky 
In the traditional Sure vs. Risky condition, the framing effect is observed for both 
samples. This is consistent with most of the previous literature (e.g., Kühberger, 1998; 
Schneider, 1992; Tombu & Mandel, 2015; Tversky & Kahneman, 1981). 
Condition 1v3: Sure vs. Somewhat-Risky Matched 
In the REP sample, we get a framing effect double the size of the standard effect. In the 
MTurk sample, it is barely significant. The Prospect Theory versions with weighting parameters 
and Sentiment Analysis both predict a framing effect. The result from the unpublished meta-
studies in DeKay Lab (DeKay, Rubinchik, & De Boeck, 2019; Rubinchik, 2019) shows a 
standard framing effect. Tombu & Mandel (2015) Experiment 1 Same Valence Pattern contains 
this comparison. They found that there was a non-significant reversed framing effect. Miller and 
Fagley (1991) found that this comparison had a framing effect of roughly the standard size. van 
der Pligt & van Schie (1990) also obtained a typical effect in their oil-production problem. 
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Condition 1v4: Sure vs. Somewhat-Risky Zero-in-loss 
This condition has a non-significant framing effect in the REP sample, but a slight 
significant effect in the MTurk sample. Schneider (1992) also found that the Sure vs. 25/75 
comparison yielded no sizeable framing effect. However, the majority of the participants were 
risk-seeking in both of her frames. 
Condition 1v5: Sure vs. Somewhat-Risky Zero-in-gain 
In this condition, the framing effect has a standard size in the MTurk sample, but is 
barely significant in the REP sample. On the other hand, Schneider (1992) found that the Sure 
vs. 75/25 comparison had a prominent framing effect. None of the theories predict a larger than 
standard framing effect. van der Pligt & van Schie (1990) found a regular sized effect when lives 
were at stake, but smaller for other domains like time and money. 
Condition 3v6: Somewhat-Risky Matched vs. Risky 
The effects in both the samples are larger than the standard effect in the respective 
samples. This is a replication of the result obtained in the unpublished meta-studies from the 
DeKay Lab (DeKay, Rubinchik, & De Boeck, 2019; Rubinchik, 2019) where the effect size was 
twice as big. The magnitude is best predicted by Fuzzy-Trace Theory + and Good/Bad Count. 
Condition 4v5: Somewhat-Risky Zero-in-loss vs. Somewhat-Risky Zero-in-gain 
The MTurk sample shows a non-significant reversal and is consistent with all the 
theories’ predictions of near-zero effects. But none of the theories predict the small significant 
framing effect seen in the REP sample. Overall, there is a preference for the Somewhat-Risky 
Zero-in-loss (less risky) option in both frames. Schneider (1992) found a significant framing 
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effect in most domains for this condition (25/75 vs. 75/25). But her data also shows a general 
preference for the less risky option, which aligns with our results. 
Condition 4v6: Somewhat-Risky Zero-in-loss vs. Risky 
A larger-than-standard framing effect is observed in the REP sample and a standard sized 
effect is present in the MTurk sample. All theories except Prospect Theory without loss aversion 
or weighting parameters (which predicts near-zero effect), correctly predict the direction but not 
the enhanced magnitude of the effect. In Schneider’s study (1992), there was a general 
preference for the less risky (25/75) option in both frames, and thus smaller framing effects in 
most domains. But in our data, we observe risk-seeking behavior in the loss frame. 
Condition 5v6: Somewhat-Risky Zero-in-gain vs. Risky 
There is a barely significant framing effect in the REP data but a slightly larger-than-
standard effect in the MTurk sample. All theories except Prospect Theory without loss aversion 
and probability weighting parameters (which predicts a near-zero effect) explain the direction of 
the effect. Schneider (1992) found almost no framing effect and got a preference for 75/25 (less 
risky) in both frames. Her findings align with our REP data, but not our MTurk data. 
II) Novel Conditions 
We have 7 novel conditions in our study (any comparison with Somewhat-Risky 
Mismatched and any comparison with Somewhat-Risky Matched paired with a somewhat-risky 
option with zero in one of the two frames). When the Somewhat-Risky Mismatched option (the 
least risky of the 4 somewhat-risky options) is paired with any other option, we usually observe a 
significant framing effect. The exception is the comparison Somewhat-Risky Mismatched vs. 
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Somewhat-Risky Matched (2v3) where both samples have a non-significant framing effect as 
predicted by all the theories.  
For Somewhat-Risky Matched vs. Somewhat-Risky Zero-in-loss (3v4; with the larger 
endpoint in gains), we see an overall preference for the Somewhat-Risky Zero-in-loss (more 
risky) option. And with Somewhat-Risky Matched vs. Somewhat-Risky Zero-in-gain (3v5), there 
is a general preference for the Somewhat-Risky Matched (less risky) option. This preference for 
the less risky option is also true for Somewhat-Risky Mismatched vs. Somewhat-Risky Zero-in-
gain (i.e., for 2v5). These results show that people liked the Somewhat-Risky Zero-in-loss option 
and disliked the Somewhat-Risky Zero-in-gain option when compared with the somewhat-risky 
options with no zero outcomes. This is also reflected in the Somewhat-Risky Zero-in-loss vs. 
Somewhat-Risky Zero-in-gain (4v5) condition above. 
Distinguishing between Theories 
 We saw a mixed performance of the theories where some theories performed better in 
some conditions and others performed better in other conditions. Following are a couple of 
conditions where we can see a distinction in their performance. 
 In Sure vs. Somewhat-Risky Matched (1v3), the versions of Prospect Theory with the 
probability weighting parameters and Sentiment Analysis correctly predict significant framing 
effects, whereas the more gist-based theories fail as they incorrectly predict non-significant 
framing. 
 In Somewhat-Risky Mismatched vs. Somewhat-Risky Zero-in-Loss (2v4) and Somewhat-
Risky Matched vs. Somewhat-Risky Zero-in-Gain (3v5), all the gist-based theories correctly 
predict that significant framing effects will be observed. On the other hand, Prospect Theory 
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versions (except the full version) fail to predict this observation. The common thing between 
these two conditions is that one of the alternatives is a somewhat-risky option with a zero in one 
of the two frames. 
 Overall, we can state that Prospect Theory performs better when the risk difference in the 
options is non-trivial (two somewhat-risky options would have a small difference in the risks) 
and neither somewhat-risky option has a zero in either frame. When a somewhat-risky option 
with zero in one of the two frames is involved, the gist-based theories pick up the “some vs. 
none” difference better. 
 
Regression Models 
When we looked at the conditions separately, we observed a variety of results as 
explained above and it was difficult to compare all the theories to each other. So, we used all the 
conditions to run mixed-effects logistic regression models to further compare theories.  
 
Model: 
Logit(Pless_risky) = (b0 + u0participant) + b1*theory+ b2*frame +b3-5*domains 
 The theory variable in each model is the prediction for each option pair (continuous for 
Prospect Theory versions and Sentiment Analysis and discrete for the Gist-based accounts) made 
by the corresponding theory (explained previously in Theories and Accounts). Gain frame is 
coded as positive (0.5) and loss as negative (-0.5). The domain variable is a 4-level categorical 
variable. 
FRAMING EFFECTS WITH SOMEWHAT RISKY OPTIONS 25 
 
Table 2 
Model summaries for REP sample 
Theory/Account Theory coeff. Frame coeff. AIC BIC AUC 
Model with no Theory variable         NA      1.00*** 4560.7 4597.7 0.85 
Prospect Theory Versions      
     Full          1.61***       .81*** 4550.2 4593.5 0.85 
     No Loss Aversion          1.92**       .82*** 4555.0 4598.2 0.84 
     No weighting parameters          5.94**       .68*** 4554.4 4597.6 0.85 
     No weighting parameters or 
     Loss aversion     
       16.33***       .45** 4543.9 4587.1 0.85 
Gist-based Accounts      
     Fuzzy-Trace Theory           .45***       .57*** 4536.5 4579.7 0.84 
     Fuzzy-Trace Theory +           .35***       .57*** 4533.4 4576.7 0.84 
     Explicated Valence Account           .45***       .57*** 4536.5 4579.7 0.84 
     Good/Bad Count           .23***       .88*** 4548.0 4591.3 0.85 
     Sentiment Analysis         1.49***       .62*** 4523.1 4566.3 0.84 
Model with Prospect Theory (No 
weighting parameters or Loss 
aversion) & Sentiment Analysis 
        5.73,  
        1.31*** 
 
      .48** 4523.4 4572.8 0.84 
***p < .001, **p < .01 , *p < .05 
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a. Prospect Theory with loss aversion and weighting 
parameters (Full version) 
 
b. Prospect Theory without loss aversion and weighting parameters 
(Plain version) 
 
c. Fuzzy-Trace Theory + (modified version of Fuzzy-Trace 
Theory) 
 
d. Sentiment Analysis 
Figure 5. Logit proportion of choices where the less risky option is chosen in the REP sample is plotted 
against the predictions of the specific theories for gain (orange) and loss (green) frame.  
 
Model summaries for the REP sample for all nine theories appear in Table 2. Figure 5 
shows the results for four of the theories, with theory predictions on the X axis and a function of 
the proportion of choices where the less risky option is chosen on the Y axis. Each graph 
contains 120 points (15 comparisons x 2 frames x 4 domains). The model summaries for all the 
theories in the REP sample (Table 2) have a significant positive coefficient, which is also seen in 
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the form of positive slopes in the 4 graphs shown in Figure 5. This positive value indicates that 
the theories explain some of the variation in choice proportions. Because predictions of different 
theories are on different scales, we cannot compare theory coefficients directly. However, there 
is always a residual framing effect which means that a significant proportion of framing is still 
unexplained by each of the theories. This is shown in the graphs in Figure 5 as a difference 
between the lines for the frames. 
Unaccounted variation shows up as scatter in the graphs of the theories. Hence, none of 
the theories is completely accurate. Area under the ROC curve (AUC) also tells us that the 
theories perform moderately well. All the models perform similarly in terms of AUC.  
Looking at Akaike information criterion (AIC) and Bayesian information criterion (BIC) 
suggests that the theories are performing similarly. Sentiment Analysis has the lowest values for 
AIC and BIC, making it a relatively better fitting theory. The simplest version of Prospect 
Theory performs slightly better than the other versions (it also has the smallest residual framing 
effect), indicating that the non-linear weighting and loss aversion might be hurting the 
performance of the theory while predicting framing effects. 
When we look at the model summaries from the MTurk sample (Table 3), we observe 
that Prospect Theory (without loss aversion or weighting parameters) performs best among the 
Prospect Theory versions and is the only theory model with a non-significant framing 
coefficient. It is followed closely by Fuzzy-Trace Theory +, Fuzzy-Trace Theory, and Explicated 
Valence Account from the Gist-based theories. Although these gist-based accounts have 
significant theory coefficients, there is still some residual framing, making them slightly worse 
than the simplest Prospect Theory. The AUC values for the MTurk sample are higher than those 
for the REP sample, indicating that the models perform better in the MTurk sample. 
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Table 3 
Model summaries for MTurk sample 
Theory/Account Theory coeff. Frame coeff. AIC BIC AUC 
Model with no Theory variable         NA      1.29*** 4587.6 4625.0 0.90 
Prospect Theory Versions      
     Full       3.46***       .88*** 4549.8 4593.5 0.90 
     No Loss Aversion      3.81***       .94*** 4568.0 4611.7 0.89 
     No weighting parameters    15.52***       .47** 4550.7 4594.4 0.90 
     No weighting parameters or 
     Loss aversion     
   32.97***       .19 4537.2 4580.9 0.90 
Gist-based Accounts      
     Fuzzy-Trace Theory       .78***       .56*** 4537.5 4581.2 0.90 
     Fuzzy-Trace Theory +       .60***       .58*** 4535.7 4579.4 0.90 
     Explicated Valence Account       .78***       .56*** 4537.5 4581.2 0.90 
     Good/Bad Count       .38***     1.08*** 4564.7 4608.4 0.90 
     Sentiment Analysis      1.63***       .88*** 4550.7 4594.4 0.90 
Model with Prospect Theory (No 
weighting parameters or Loss 
aversion) & Sentiment Analysis 
    25.12***,  
        .96** 
 
      .21 4528.7 4578.6 0.90 
***p < .001, **p < .01 , *p < .05  
In some graphs, we observe more scatter in the loss frame (see Figure 5). We also created 
models containing the interaction effects between the frame and theory variables and obtained 
similar results for model fit. In general, slopes were more positive for gains than for losses. 
However, since our goal was to check the theory fit (not the model fit), we excluded interaction 
effects from our primary models. Because we have not included interaction terms in these 
models, the trendlines are parallel for the gains and losses. 
 
FRAMING EFFECTS WITH SOMEWHAT RISKY OPTIONS 29 
 
Complications and Limitations 
Fitting Prospect Theory. We speculated that using the standard parameters from Tversky and 
Kahneman’s 1992 paper for Prospect Theory could be hurting model performance. For this 
reason we fit Prospect theory to the data using the cpt_d() function in R (Jarecki, 2020). Then, 
we used the new parameters (check the Appendix) to obtain Prospect Theory predictions for the 
various conditions, which unfortunately did not help model performance.  
Riskiness order for problematic comparisons. The Prospect Theory version with no loss aversion 
or weighting parameters has a positive prediction in the loss frame for the comparisons 
Somewhat-risky Mismatched vs. Somewhat-risky Matched (2v3) and Somewhat-risky zero-in-loss 
vs. Somewhat-risky zero-in-gain (4v5) (see Figure 5b). This prediction that the less risky option 
will be preferred in the loss frame is counterintuitive.  
 Consider Somewhat-risky Mismatched vs. Somewhat-risky Matched (2v3) in the Cancer 
domain: 
[Gain frame] 
Somewhat-risky Mismatched option (2): There is a 1/4 probability that 7,500 patients will be 
saved and a 3/4 probability that 2,300 patients will be saved. 
Somewhat-risky Matched option (3): There is a 2/5 probability that 6,300 patients will be 
saved and a 3/5 probability that 1,800 patients will be saved. 
[Loss frame] 
Somewhat-risky Mismatched option (2): There is a 1/4 probability that 1,500 patients will die 
and a 3/4 probability that 6,700 patients will die. 
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Somewhat-risky Matched option (3): There is a 2/5 probability that 2,700 patients will die 
and a 3/5 probability that 7,200 patients will die. 
With these numbers, the simplest Prospect Theory predicts that the Somewhat-Risky 
Mismatched (less risky) option would be preferred by more people in the gain frame but also in 
the loss frame.  
This counterintuitive prediction also occurs for the Somewhat-risky zero-in-loss vs. 
Somewhat-risky zero-in-gain (4v5) comparison. Other versions of Prospect Theory have positive 
predictions for some other conditions, but this positive prediction from the simplest Prospect 
Theory was especially surprising. It was unexpected since the value function should have shown 
a negative difference (risk-seeking) in the loss frame, no matter how small the magnitude in this 
version of the theory. Loss aversion and weighting parameters were 1, so they couldn’t have 
caused a change in the sign of the prediction. The reason why the theory predicted this positive 
value is because when the two options are very close in riskiness, shifting to the loss frame gives 
different numbers resulting a change in the difference sign. 
This raised a question about whether the riskiness order of the options in the gain frame 
was no longer applicable for the loss frame, which would imply that people found Somewhat-
risky Mismatched (2) riskier than Somewhat-risky Matched (3) and Somewhat-risky zero-in-loss 
(4) riskier than Somewhat-risky zero-in-gain (5) in the loss frame.  
To solve this ambiguity in the riskiness order for the loss frame, we implemented two 
solutions. First, we reversed the order of riskiness for the two options in the loss frame for both 
of these conditions, swapped the coding of the corresponding choices and predictions in the data, 
and ran the models on the new data. We would also have to think about whether it would be right 
to call it framing effect if the same option were chosen in both the frames (after reversing the 
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riskiness order in the loss frame). Second, we dropped the 2v3 and 4v5 conditions and re-ran the 
models. Our models looked similar to our original models (Refer to Appendix for more details). 
Hence, we decided to stay with our original setup for our analysis. 
Study Limitations 
 The types of options in our option pool were also limited. There are many other ways to 
create options to study framing effects (e.g., completing the sure option, truncating the risky 
option). Using a more diverse choice set could provide more insight into the strengths and 
weaknesses of the theories and inform the creation of a better theory to explain risky-choice 
decision making. Another limitation of this study is that it had a between-subjects design for the 
15 conditions, which does not allow us to assess whether a theory (e.g., Prospect Theory) works 
better for some participants than for others. We are currently working on the within-subjects 
version of this study.  
 
Conclusion 
 The current literature consists of multiple theories explaining risky-choice framing 
effects. We expanded the option set to include four types of somewhat-risky options and tested 
the theories to see how well they would generalize. A significant framing effect was observed in 
almost all of the conditions. Mixed models revealed that all the theories explained framing 
effects to some extent. However, there was still a residual framing effect and some unexplained 
variation in the data. Hence, none of the theories performed extremely well in predicting the 
participant choices. This research demonstrates that testing on a wide range of options reveals 
the shortcomings in the existing theories. The Prospect Theory version without loss aversion and 
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weighting parameters performed better than the full Prospect Theory, indicating that these 
parameters hurt the performance of the theory with respect to framing effects, at least in our data. 
Since we see mixed results for the theories when we look at each of the conditions separately, we 
can logically conclude that people might implement different problem-solving strategies 
depending on the option pairs, instead of applying a general set of principles to all option 
comparisons. Hence, further research needs to be done with an even broader option pool or with 
another effect in risky-choice decision making to determine which strategies are applied by 
which people in what specific situations. This research will help in revising the current theories 
or coming up with a better theory to explain people’s thought process when faced with a choice 
involving risk.   
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Imagine that the wildfire season is about to start and an old-growth forest in the 
Northwest of the U.S. will be affected. This forest is home to 6,000 animals that are endangered 
by the fire. Two programs have been proposed to protect the animals. 
Drought: 
Imagine that a severe drought is foreseen to hit the state of Missouri next summer. The 
drought will cause the destruction of 48,000 acres of crops. Two programs of water supply have 
been proposed. 
Investment: 
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Imagine that John invested $72,000 in a company. The company's financial situation is in 
jeopardy, and so is John's investment. Two alternatives are available. 
 
Option Construction 
We considered the following probability values in the Gain frame: 1/5, 1/4, 1/3, 2/5, 1/2, 
3/5, 2/3, 3/4, 4/5. For the four domains [Investment, Cancer, Drought, Wildfire] we used [1/3, 
2/5, 1/2, 3/5] respectively as the probability of the ‘all’ outcome in the Risky option in the gain 
frame. This probability was assigned to the greater outcome in the Somewhat-risky Matched 
option. For the higher outcomes of the Somewhat-risky Mismatched and Somewhat-risky zero-in-
loss options, we assigned the probability that was two steps lower in the list than the probability 
for the Risky option, i.e. [1/5, 1/4, 1/3, 2/5] respectively. For the Somewhat-risky zero-in-gain 
option, we went two steps above the probability for the Risky option, i.e. [1/2, 3/5, 2/3, 3/4] 
respectively. We assigned total magnitudes for each domain such that they were divisible by the 
probabilities of that domain [72000, 9000, 48000, 6000]. The Risky and Somewhat-risky zero-in-
gain options had ‘0’ as the smaller outcome. The rest of the outcome values were filled so that 
the expected values of all the options was the same. For the Loss frame, we used the same 
probabilities but shifted outcomes from the Gain frame [Total magnitude – Corresponding 
Outcome of option]. 
Table 4 
Model summaries for REP sample with 13 out of 15 conditions (without 2v3 and 4v5) 
Theory/Account Theory coeff. Frame coeff. AIC BIC AUC 
Model with no Theory variable         NA    1.03*** 4256.6 4293.2 0.85 
Prospect Theory Versions      
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     Full       1.54**      .83*** 4248.4 4291.2 0.85 
     No Loss Aversion       2.23**      .82*** 4249.3 4292.0 0.84 
     No weighting parameters       5.02*      .75*** 4253.3 4296.0 0.85 
     No weighting parameters or 
     Loss aversion     
    15.03***      .50** 4244.1 4286.8 0.85 
Gist-based Accounts      
     Fuzzy-Trace Theory        .45***     .59*** 4235.4 4278.2 0.84 
     Fuzzy-Trace Theory +       .35***     .59*** 4232.4 4275.2 0.84 
     Explicated Valence Account       .45***     .59*** 4235.4 4278.2 0.84 
     Good/Bad Count       .22***     .91*** 4245.6 4288.3 0.85 
     Sentiment Analysis     1.36***     .67*** 4228.1 4270.8 0.85 
Model with Prospect Theory (No 
weighting parameters or Loss 
aversion) & Sentiment Analysis 
     5.30,  
     1.20*** 
 
    .53** 4228.7 4277.6 0.85 
***p < .001, **p < .01 , *p < .05 
Table 5 
Model summaries for REP sample with coding reversal for 2v3 and 4v5 
Theory/Account Theory coeff. Frame coeff. AIC BIC AUC 
Model with no Theory variable         NA  1.09*** 4544.0 4581.1 0.85 
Prospect Theory Versions      
     Full      1.54**   .85*** 4537.8 4581.0 0.85 
     No Loss Aversion      2.20**   .84*** 4538.2 4581.4 0.84 
     No weighting parameters      2.88   .93*** 4544.6 4587.8 0.85 
     No weighting parameters or 
     Loss aversion     
   12.79**   .64*** 4536.5 4579.7 0.85 
Gist-based Accounts      
     Fuzzy-Trace Theory     .44***    .62*** 4526.0 4569.3 0.85 
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     Fuzzy-Trace Theory +     .34***    .64*** 4523.4 4566.6 0.85 
     Explicated Valence Account     .44***    .62*** 4526.0 4569.3 0.85 
     Good/Bad Count     .21***     .95*** 4534.4 4577.7 0.84 
     Sentiment Analysis   1.37***     .71*** 4515.5 4558.7 0.84 
Model with Prospect Theory (No 
weighting parameters or Loss 
aversion) & Sentiment Analysis 
    2.90,  
    1.29*** 
 
    .63*** 4517.1 4566.5 0.85 
***p < .001, **p < .01 , *p < .05 
Parameters for the fitted Cumulative Prospect Theory 
We standardized the stimuli for each domain by dividing the outcomes with the 
respective total magnitudes. Then we fitted Cumulative Prospect Theory to our data from the 
REP sample providing the stimuli to the cpt_d() function (Jarecki, 2020). The parameter values 
we obtained were power for gains = .737, power for losses = .001, probability weighting for 
gains = .945, probability weighting for losses = 1.145, and loss aversion = .030. 
Theory/Account Theory coeff. Frame coeff. AIC BIC AUC 
Fitted Prospect Theory Model         .21*      .81*** 4556.5 4599.7 0.85 
***p < .001, **p < .01 , *p < .05 
The parameters for gains are sensible and consistent with standard Prospect Theory 
values. However, the parameters for losses (e.g., for loss aversion) make much less sense. The 
very low exponent (.001) yields a value function that is essentially horizontal in losses.  
